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WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
Volume 46, Number 4, 1971
THE ALLOCATION OF JURISDICTION
BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS
IN PATENT LITIGATION
Donald Shelby Chisum*
It is essential that we achieve a proper jurisdictional balance be-
tween the Federal and State court systems, assigning to each
system those cases most appropriate in the light of the basic
principles of federalism.
Earl Warren
This article reviews and reassesses some ancient doctrine about the
subject matter jurisdiction of state and federal courts over patent mat-
ters.2 The catalyst for such an examination is Koratron Company v.
Deering Milliken, Inc.,3 decided recently in the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The case breaks only a minimum of
new ground, and the result on the particular facts is not disturbing.
But Koratron serves to emphasize a curious anomaly in the law of
federal jurisdiction that has been recently aggravated by a develop-
ment in the field of substantive patent law. The "anomaly" is that a
federal forum may be unavailable to a party in a case involving im-
portant issues of federal patent law despite the express dictate of 28
U.S.C. § 1338(a) that the original jurisdiction of the United States
District Courts over civil actions arising under the federal patent
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Washington. A.B. 1966, LL.B. 1968,
Stanford University.
1. A 2nmca= LAW INSTrTuTE, 1959 PROCEEDiNGS 33 (1960).
2. The problem of the subject matter jurisdiction of state and federal courts over
copyright matters is closely related, especially since federal court jurisdiction over both
copyright and patent cases is conferred by the same statute-28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1964).
I have chosen to limit myself to patent problems with the passing thought that different
jurisdictional rules might be justified by differences in the substantive policies of the
federal patent and copyright laws. On the division of jurisdiction between federal and
state courts over copyright matters, see generally, M. NnXKER, TEm LAW oF COPYRIGHT
567-73 (1970).
3. 418 F.2d 1314 (9th Cir. 1969).
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laws shall be exclusive of the state courts.4 The aggravating patent law
development is the Supreme Court's recent rejection of the doctrine
that a patent licensee is estopped to challenge the validity of his
licensor's patent.5
After reviewing the history of the successive statutes granting
jurisdiction over patent matters to the federal courts from the Patent
Act of 1790 to the present 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a), I shall focus first on
the general problem of the jurisdiction of the United States District
Courts and the state courts over cases involving questions of federal
law and then on the more specialized problem of their jurisdiction
over cases involving questions of federal patent law. Thereafter, I
will consider the Koratron case in the light of this background and
conclude with an evaluation of the present division of jurisdiction
over patent controversies between state and federal courts and the
proposals to alter and rationalize that division.
I. STATUTORY DEVELOPMENT SINCE 1790
Article I of the Constitution gives Congress the power "[t]o pro-
mote the Progress of Science and useful Arts by securing for limited
times to . . . Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective . . .
Discoveries.O' Pursuant to this power, Congress passed the first Pat-
ent Act in 17901 authorizing the executive branch' of the federal
4. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1964) provides:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action arising under
any Act of Congress relating to patents, copyrights and trademarks. Such jurisdiction
shall be exclusive of the courts of the states in patent and copyright cases.
5. Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969).
6. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
7. Act of April 10, 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109. See generally, B. BUOBEE, THE EARLY
AMERICAN LAW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TE
UNITED STATES PATENT AND COPYRIGHT SYSTEMS 299-394 (1960).
8. Under the 1790 Act, an inventor was required to petition the Secretary of State,
Secretary of War, and the Attorney General for a patent which could be issued by the
assent of any two of those officers. Act of April 10, 1790, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109; B.
BUGBEE, supra note 7, at 361-63. Under the Patent Act of 1793, patent petitions were to
be directed only to the Secretary of State. Act of February 21, 1793, ch. 11, § 1, 1 Stat.
318; B. BUOBEE, supra note 7, at 364. Secretary of State Madison created a separate
Patent Office in 1802. Id. at 365. The Patent Office, headed by a Commissioner, was given
statutory status in 1836. Act of July 4, 1836, ch. 357, § 1, 5 Stat. 117. In 1849, the Patent
Office was transferred to the newly created Interior Department. Act of March 3, 1849,
ch. 108, § 2, 9 Stat. 395. Finally, the Patent Office was transferred to the Department of
Commerce in 1925 by executive order, Executive Order No. 4175 of March 17, 1925,
where it remains to this day. 35 U.S.C. § 1 (1964).
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government to issue United States letters patent to any person or
persons for any useful invention or discovery of any "art, manufac-
ture, engine, machine, or device, or any improvement therein" if said
invention or discovery was found to be "sufficiently useful and im-
portant."9 The letters patent granted to the petitioner (the "pat-
entee") for a period of years the "sole and exclusive right and liberty
of making, constructing, using and vending to others to be used the
said invention or discovery."' 0 This basic pattern for the issuance of
patents set in 1790 has been followed in all the subsequent enactments
of federal patent acts.
The basic pattern for patent litigation was also set by the 1790 Act.
It gave the patentee a judicial remedy for infringement, that is, the
use, manufacture, or sale of the invention or discovery covered by
letters patent by any person without the consent of the patentee." The
judicial remedy was in the form of an "action on the case,"' 2 and the
patentee could collect "such damages as shall be assessed by a jury"
and also obtain a forfeiture of chattels made in violation of his
patent.13 Section 6 gave the defendant in an infringement action the
extremely important defense of the invalidity of the plaintiff's patent.',4
While the issuance of letters patent to the patentee was "prima facie
evidence" that the plaintiff's patent was valid, the defendant could
prove that in fact the plaintiff was not entitled to a patent because he
was not the first and true inventor or because he failed to make full
and accurate disclosure in applying for the letters patent.
The 1790 Act did not specify which courts-state, federal or both-
should have subject matter jurisdiction over infringement actions.
Since the Judiciary Act of 1789 did not give the lower federal courts
jurisdiction over actions arising under federal law,15 the natural
9. Act of April 10, 1790, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109.
1O. Id.
11. Id. § 4.
12. After the English Statute of Monopolies in 1624, which banned royal grants of
monopolies but excepted letters patent to first inventors, infringement of a patent was
considered a tort at common law for which the patent owner could recover consequential
damages through an action for trespass on the case. 1 W. Rooaas, TEx LAW OP PATENTS
201 (1914). The availability of equitable relief was slow in developing. The federal
circuit courts were given equity jurisdiction over infringement actions in 1819. Act of
February 15, 1819, ch. 19, 3 Stat. 481. See 35 U.S.C. § 283 (1964).
13. Act of April 10, 1790, ch. 7, § 4, 1 Stat. 109.
14. Id. § 6.
15. The Judiciary Act gave the lower federal courts jurisdiction only over habeas
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inference must have been that the state courts and only the state
courts would have jurisdiction over infringement actions. This in-
ference was quickly altered by the Patent Act of 1793 which provided
that an "action on the case" for patent infringement could be brought
"in the circuit court of United States, or any other court having
competent jurisdiction."' 16 This pattern of concurrent state and federal
jurisdiction over infringement actions was destroyed by the Patent Act
of 1800, which gave jurisdiction over actions on the case for infringe-
ment to "the circuit court of the United States, having jurisdiction
thereof." 7 The Act did not expressly provide that such jurisdiction
was to be exclusive of the state courts, but since the jurisdictional pro-
vision was incorporated into the very statute granting the right of
action, and since the statute omitted the phrase "or any other court
having competent jurisdiction," Congress' intent to make the jurisdic-
tion of the federal circuit courts over infringement actions exclusive
of the state courts was clear.
Why did the 1800 Congress choose to make federal jurisdiction
over infringement actions exclusive? It is difficult to judge from afar.
I seriously question whether Congress considered any of the reasons
frequently tendered by modern commentators. One such reason
tendered is that Congress intended to promote uniformity of decision
on important issues of federal patent law by concentrating infringe-
ment actions in the federal judiciary rather than in the judiciaries of
the several states. 8 Another is that the concentration of infringement
actions in the federal courts would allow them to develop the expertise
necessary to decide the technical problems so frequently raised in
patent cases.' 9 But the notions that state judges could not be relied
upon to decide accurately questions of federal law, that federal judges
were experts on federal law, and that greater uniformity in the decision
of important issues of federal law could be achieved by concentrating
litigation in the federal judiciary were not widely held in the early
corpus petitions, federal crimes and seizures, admiralty and maritime cases, suits by the
United States for an amount over $100, suits by aliens, and suits between citizens of
different states for an amount over $500. The Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, §§ 9, 11, 14,
1 Stat. 73.
16. Act of February 21, 1793, ch. 11, § 5, 1 Stat. 318.
17. Act of April 17, 1800, ch. 25, § 3, 2 Stat. 37.
18. 70 HARv. L. REv. 509, 511-12 (1957).
19. Id. at 512.
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years of our Republic. Congress had not yet even given the lower
federal courts concurrent jurisdiction over most cases involving federal
law.2 0
More likely the reasons for making federal jurisdiction exclusive
were more prosaic, at least as viewed from modern times. One reason
may have been simply a perceived impropriety in allowing a state
court to annul the act of a high federal officer. If state courts could
entertain an infringement action, they necessarily would also hear the
statutory defense that a patent was invalid. A holding of invalidity
impugned the action of the federal officer in granting the letters
patent.2' Another reason may have been connected with the Patent
Act of 1800 provision that an unsuccessful defendant in an infringe-
ment action should "forfeit" to the patentee "a sum equal to three
times the actual damage sustained."22 This treble damage provision
could have been viewed as penal, and state jurisdiction thought im-
proper because it resulted in the courts of one sovereign enforcing the
criminal laws of another.
Whatever the original reasoning, it became the established rule in
1800, maintained to this day,23 that federal jurisdiction over infringe-
ment actions is exclusive of the state courts.
The Patent Act of 1819 was a milestone of sorts because for the
first time a jurisdictional grant to the federal circuit courts was en-
acted separate from the express provision for an infringement remedy.
While the 1800 Act continued to provide for an infringement remedy
through an action on the case in the federal circuit courts, the 1819
Act also provided that "the circuit courts of the United States shall
have original cognizance ... of all actions ... arising under any law
20. See note 15, supra, and text accompanying note 35, infra.
21. For an early decision in which a state court ruled on the validity of a patent,
see Burral v. Jewett, 2 Paige 134, 145 (N.Y. 1830). See also 31 CoLum. L. REv. 461,
462 n.1 (1931).
22. Act of April 7, 1800, ch. 25, § 3, 2 Stat. 37. The 1793 Act had provided that an
infringer could be assessed three times the patentee's usual royalty. Act of February 21,
1793, ch. 11, § 5, 1 Stat. 318. The provision for treble damages has been altered through
time. The Patent Act of 1800 apparently made the recovery of treble damages automatic
in infringement actions. Later acts made the increase of up to treble damages discretionary
with the court. See, e.g., Act of July 4, 1836, ch. 357, § 14, 5 Stat. 117. The present statute
provides simply that "the court may increase the damages up to three times the amount
found [by the jury] or assessed [by the court]." 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1964). Increased
damages are generally awarded only for willful or grossly careless infringement. See 72
HAav. L. REV. 328, 348 (1958).
23. 28 U.S.C.,§ 1338 (1964).
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of the United States, granting or confirming to . . . investors the
exclusive right to their respective... inventions and discoveries .... ,
Similar language was again used in 1836.25 Thus, the grant of patent
jurisdiction incorporated the notorious "arising under" language of
Article III of the Constitution and all the problems of interpretation
that surround it." It also seemingly raised the question whether any
action other than one for infringement could be an action "arising
under" the federal patent laws.27 The last statutory milestone for
patent jurisdiction came with the Revised Statutes of 1874 which made
the jurisdiction of the federal courts over "all cases arising under the
patent ... laws of the United States" expressly exclusive of the state
courts.2 However, the language of express exclusivity was thought
to be declaratory of existing law. The jurisdictional statutes on patent
cases have remained essentially the same up to the present.
II. "ARISING UNDER" JURISDICTION: THE GENERAL
PROBLEM
The federal courts have had, since at least 1836, exclusive jurisdic-
tion of all cases "arising under" the federal patent laws. The crucial
question in determining both the scope of federal court jurisdiction
over patent matters and the scope of the exclusion of state courts
from jurisdiction over patent matters is, therefore, when does a case
arise under the patent laws?2 That question immediately leads into
24. Act of February 15, 1819, ch. 19, 3 Stat. 481 (emphasis added).
25. Act of July 4, 1836, ch. 357, § 17, 5 Stat. 117. An early state case suggested that
federal jurisdiction over cases "arising under" the patent laws was not made exclusive by
the 1819 Act but was made so by the 1836 Act. Gibson v. Woodworth, 8 Paige 132 (N.Y.
1840). Neither act used the word "exclusive," and the only difference between them is
that the former gave the federal circuit courts "original cognizance" of cases arising under
patent laws while the latter provided that all cases arising under the patent laws "shall be
originally cognizable" in the federal circuit courts.
26. See the discussion in section III, infra.
27. Besides infringement actions, Congress clearly intended to include bills in equity to
resolve patent interferences within the category of "actions arising under" the patent
laws. Such bills were created in 1836. Act of July 4, 1836, ch. 357, § 16, 5 Stat. 117. I
will direct little discussion toward patent litigation in the nature of judicial review of
administrative decisions concerning the issuance of patents or resolutions of interfering
applications for patents by different inventors. Such judicial review has always been
concentrated in the federal courts only. E.g., Act of March 3, 1839, ch. 88, § 11, 5 Stat.
353; 35 U.S.C. §§ 145, 146 (1964).
28. Act of June 22, 1874, Tit. XIII, ch. 12, § 711, 18 Stat. (Part 1) 134.
29. As suggested later, contrary to common assumption, the two issues can and should
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one of the darkest corridors of the law of federal courts and federal
jurisdiction.80
Section 2 of Article III of the United States Constitution enumerates
the categories of cases to which the "Judicial Power of the United
States" shall extend. In other words, it specifies the kinds of original
subject matter jurisdiction that Congress can confer by statute upon
the lower federal courts. One of the major categories is "Cases ...
arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and
Treaties made ...under their Authority.""' Except for a brief one
year span in the early nineteenth century,32 Congress has never seen
fit to give the lower federal courts jurisdiction over all such cases
"arising under" federal law within the meaning of Article III. s3 Until
1875, jurisdiction was conferred only over cases arising under certain
specified federal laws. Cases arising under other federal laws could be
brought only in the state courts. The successive statutes giving the
be separately considered, admitting the possibility that federal court jurisdiction can be
broader than state court exclusion. See text accompanying note 153, infra.
30. Articles and studies on the scope and meaning of jurisdiction over "cases arising
under federal law" are many, E.g., AmanzcAN LAW INsTITUTE, STUDY or THE DIVISION OF
Ju3rSDICTioN BE wEEx STATE AxD FEDERAL CouRTs. 162-207, 477-88 (1969) [hereinafter
cited as ALI STUDY]; Cohen, The Broken Compass: The Requirement That a Case Arise
"Directly" Under Federal Law, 155 U. PA. L. REv. 890 (1967); London, "Federal Ques-
tion" Jurisdiction-A Snare and a Delusion, 57 Mc. L. REv. 835 (1959); Mishkin,
The Federal "Question" in the District Courts, 53 Cor. m. L. REv. 157 (1953).
31. U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 2.
These are the other categories: (1) "all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public
Ministers and Consuls," (2) "all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction," (3)
"Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party," and (4) "Controversies
between" (a) "two or more States," (b) "a State and Citizens of another State," (c)
"Citizens of different States," (d) "Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under
Grants of different States," and (e) "a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States,
Citizens or Subjects."
32. Plenary federal question jurisdiction was conferred on the lower federal courts in
1801 by the lame-duck Federalist Party. Act of February 13, 1801, ch. 4, § 11, 2 Stat. 89
and quickly repealed in 1802 by the Jeffersonians, Act of March 8, 1802, ch. 8, § 1, 2
Stat. 132. The 1801 statute, the "Midnight Judges" Act, has generally been considered
as an attempt by the Federalists to maintain control over at least one branch of the
federal government-the Judiciary. Modern commentators, however, have suggested that
the "act was not a last-minute effort" and that "its primary purpose was the extension of
federal jurisdiction to suits that could previously be tried only in state courts." R.
RICHA OsoN AND K. Vnm, THE POLITICS or FEDERAL COURTs 25 (1970) (emphasis
supplied).
33. Justice Story argued that while Congress had discretion under Article III whether
or not to create federal courts below the Supreme Court, once it had decided to do so
those courts acquired the full scope of their Article III powers-including jurisdiction
over all cases arising under federal law. See Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.)
304, 327-30 (1819); Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of
1789, 37 HARv. L. REv. 49, 68 (1923). The Supreme Court early rejected this argument,
holding that the lower federal courts have only such jurisdiction as Congress confers
upon them by statute. Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441 (1850).
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federal courts jurisdiction over patent cases offer good examples 4 In
1875, Congress did give the federal courts jurisdiction over cases aris-
ing under any federal law, 5 but the jurisdiction extended only to those
cases in which the amount in controversy exceeded a specified sum. 6
The words "arising under" therefore present at least two separate
questions of interpretation. First, what is the scope of "arising under"
jurisdiction within the meaning of Article III? This is a constitutional
question as to the power of Congress to confer subject matter jurisdic-
tion on the federal courts. Second, what is the scope of "arising under"
jurisdiction within the meaning of the various Congressional statutes
conferring jurisdiction over cases "arising under" federal law, includ-
ing the statute conferring exclusive jurisdiction over actions "arising
under" the federal patent laws? This is a question of statutory inter-
pretation as to the intent of Congress.
The question of the scope of Congress' constitutional power has
arisen very infrequently, principally because Congress has rarely even
attempted to approach the limits of its Article III powers to confer
subject matter jurisdiction on the lower federal courts.a In Osborn v.
Bank of the United States,38 an early and still leading case considering
the scope of Article III "arising under" jurisdiction, Chief Justice
Marshall defined it very broadly. He opined that a case arises under
34. Other examples include the following: (1) Cases arising under the postal laws,
Act of March 3, 1845, ch. 43, § 20, 5 Stat. 732; (2) Cases arising under the internal
revenue laws, Act of July 13, 1866, ch. 184, §§ 9, 19, 14 Stat. 98; (3) Cases arising under
copyright laws, Act of February 15, 1819, ch. 19, 3 Stat. 481.
35. Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. (Part 3) 470 (1875), 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331 (1964).
36. In 1875, the amount was $500, Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. (Part
3) 470 adopting the amount required in diversity cases. See note 15, supra. The amount
in controversy requirement for both diversity and arising-under-federal-law cases has
been periodically raised-to $2,000 in 1887 (Act of March 3, 1887, ch. 273, § 1, 24 Stat.
552), to $3,000 in 1911 (Act of March 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 24, 36 Stat. 1087), and to
S10,000 in 1958 (Act of July 25, 1958, Pub L. No. 85-554, § 1, 72 Stat. 415). The amount
in controversy requirement has always been used merely as a device to limit the caseload
of the federal courts. The ALI proposes to eliminate the requirement for cases arising
under federal law. ALI STUDY, supra note 30, at 24, 172-76, 489-92.
37. The problem was raised, though not necessarily decided, in the following cases:
Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957) (power of Congress to
confer jurisdiction over labor contract disputes where the substantive law is state law) ;
National Mutual Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582 (1949) (power of
Congress to confer jurisdiction over all cases between District of Columbia residents and
state citizens); Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1819)
(power of Congress to confer jurisdiction over all cases in which a federally chartered
bank is a party); Hodgson v. Bowerbank, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 303 (1809) (power of
Congress to confer jurisdiction over all cases in which an alien is a party).
38. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1819).
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federal law whenever a question or issue of federal law "forms an
ingredient of the original cause." There need be no actual dispute
between the parties as to the federal ingredient; it does not matter that
the federal ingredient is clearly settled one way or the other. In
Osborn, Marshall interpreted a federal statute as conferring jurisdic-
tion on the federal courts over all litigation to which the federally
chartered Bank of the United States was a party, including litigation
involving a simple contract or tort that would be governed by state
law. Every action involving the Bank was a case arising under federal
law because the Bank's capacity to sue, be sued, and to contract were
all conferred by federal law and might be drawn into question in any
case.
The second question-that concerning the scope of congressional
grants of jurisdiction has arisen very frequently. The federal courts
have repeatedly faced the problem of whether a given case before
them is one "arising under" federal law within the meaning of the
various jurisdictional statutes adopting the Article III language3 9
However, despite this enormous inventory of judicial opinions con-
sidering the problem, no clear analytical test has ever been developed.
As the American Law Institute notes:40
In determining which cases are federal question cases, within
the statutory grant of jurisdiction, there is a proliferation of
theories, but the case law cannot be rationalized by any one of
them.
The ALI reviews five theories, of which only the first two are im-
portant for present purposes.4 1 A case arises under federal law if:
1. federal law is an "ingredient" of the case;
2. federal law creates the claim.
The first theory, tendered by Marshall in Osborn v. Bank of the
39. See, e.g., Moore v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 291 U.S. 205 (1934); Smith v. Kansas
City Title & T. Co., 255 U.S. 180 (1921); California v. General Motors Corp., 431 F.2d
732 (9th Cir. 1970); Board of Educ. v. York, 429 F.2d 66 (10th Cir. 1970); T.B. Harms
Co. v. Eliscu, 339 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1964); Rosenthal & Rosenthal, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. &
Sur. Co., 259 F. Supp. 624 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
40. ALI STUDy, supra note 30, at 482.
41. Id. 482-88. The other three theories would allow a case to arise under federal law:
1. construction of a federal law is involved;
2. an actual issue, legal or factual, as to the federal right is involved;
3. the federal question might be prejudiced in the state court.
641
Washington Law Review
United States,42 is by far the broadest of the five. While Marshall's test
is imprecise, most commentators agree that he was on the right track
in giving a broad reading to "arising under" jurisdiction as a construc-
tion of Congress' Article III power to confer original jurisdiction on
the federal courts.43 But as a construction of the jurisdictional statutes
conferring "arising under" jurisdiction, Marshall's test is too broad,
because it would provide a federal forum for too many cases, including
those where the federal interest in providing such a forum is minimal.
Initially, one would assume that when Congress used the language
of Article III in a jurisdictional statute, it intended that statute to
have the same scope as Article III. There are, however, good reasons
for giving the jurisdictional statutes a different and narrower construc-
tion than Article III. As one commentator has noted : 4
The situations in which a sympathetic forum may be required
for the vindication of national rights cannot always be foreseen,
and there must be power under the Constitution to provide for
those eventualities. Yet some of these situations may fall into
patterns abstractly identical with those of many other cases that
do not in fact involve any present national interest. To hold that
the federal trial courts are actually invested with virtually the
full constitutional range of jurisdiction over federal questions
might well flood the national courts, thereby deflecting them from
their real functions.
Justice Holmes was the most vigorous advocate of the second
theory that a case arises under federal law only when federal law
creates the plaintiff's claim or cause of action.45 The theory meshed
well with Holmes' philosophy of law.46 Law is not an abstract set of
intellectual principles; rather it is the command of the sovereign. If a
person has a right to sue, it is because the sovereign says so. To test
whether a case "arises under" federal law, one should ask which
sovereign authorized this plaintiff to sue? Which sovereign created the
defendant's duty to the plaintiff and the plaintiff's remedy for a breach
of that duty? If the answer is the federal sovereign, then the action
42. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1819).
43. London, supra note 30, at 837-41; Mishkin, supra note 30, at 162-63.
44. Mishkin, supra note 30, at 162.
45. Smith v. Kansas City Title & T. Co., 255 U.S. 180, 213 (1921) (dissenting
opinion); American Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257 (1916).
46. See Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HAgv. L. Rlv. 457 (1897).
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arises under federal law. If the answer is a state sovereign, then the
action arises under state law.4 7
Holmes' theory is supplemented by an important analytical test for
determining whether a case arises under federal law. Under the Well-
Pleaded Complaint Rule,4" the court looks only to the well pleaded
portions of the plaintiff's complaint to determine whether an action
arises under federal law. Two things about the Well-Pleaded Com-
plaint Rule should be noted. First, the Rule is based on the notion
that the federal court's jurisdiction must be determined from the outset
on the basis of the plaintiff's complaint. 9 Second, the Rule excludes
the possibility that a plaintiff can mold his action to arise under
federal law by anticipating and avoiding a potential federal defense
that the defendant may have to plaintiff's cause of action under state
law.50
The Holmes test, supplemented by the Well-Pleaded Complaint
Rule, is as narrow in defining arising under jurisdiction as Marshall's
Osborn test is broad. In many instances, it is undoubtedly too narrow.
A case may require the resolution of a multitude of hotly contested
federal questions, yet under the Holmes test it would not arise under
federal law if the plaintiff is pursuing a state-created remedy that
incorporates issues of federal law or if federal law merely creates a
defense to the state law claim. Furthermore, not all of the cases
decided within the "arising under" jurisdiction can be reconciled by
the Holmes test. In some cases, an action has been held to arise under
federal law even though the plaintiff was seeking a state created
47. Holmes' test was intended to be analytical and easy to apply. In fact, it has its
own problems of application. For example, in Moore v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 291 U.S.
205 (1934), the plaintiff sought to recover damages caused by violation of a federal safety
statute under a state law making violation of a statute actionable negligence per se.
The case was held to "arise under" state law on the theory that state remedial law was
merely adopting by reference the federal law which established a standard of conduct.
One could also argue, however, that the action arises under federal law on the theory
that the federal law establishing the standard of conduct was adopting by reference the
state remedial law. Cohen supra note 30, at 897-900.
48. See ALI STUDY, supra note 30, at 169-72. The Rule has been much berated be-
cause what must be pleaded by the plaintiff depends mostly on the old procedural
"forms of action" that have been abolished for most other purposes (see FED. R. C iv.
P. 2). Mishkin, supra note 30, at 176-77.
49. This rationale for the Rule has been criticized because jurisdiction could be es-
tablished at the outset by requiring the plaintiff to include special jurisdictional allegations
if the federal law element did not appear otherwise on the face of his complaint. Mishkin,
supra note 30 at 164.
go. Louisville & N. R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908).
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remedy.5' In other cases, an action has been held not to arise under
federal law even though the plaintiff was seeking a remedy created by
Congress . 2 Nevertheless, the Holmes test probably explains more cases
than any other theory.
III. ARISING UNDER JURISDICTION: THE PATENT CASES
If one were to accept the Marshall theory as the proper construction
of the statute giving the federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over all
cases "arising under" the patent laws, then literally every case involv-
ing a patent in any way would be within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the federal courts. The patent would form an "ingredient" of the
action, and some issue of patent law might be raised. Supplementing
the Marshall test with the Well-Pleaded Complaint Rule would
eliminate very few cases since the fact that a patent is in some way
involved almost inevitably appears on the face of the plaintiff's well
pleaded complaint.
The courts have uniformly rejected the broad Marshall theory. But
they have found no solution other than to adopt the strict and overly
narrow Holmes test. The result is at least a theoretical misallocation
of jurisdiction between state and federal courts-the federal courts
taking jurisdiction over cases turning solely or primarily on questions
of state contract law and state courts taking jurisdiction over cases
turning solely or primarily on questions of federal patent law.
A. The License and Assignment Modes
This is not the place to review the intricate differences between a
patent license and an assignment of a patent. 3 Technically, an assign-
ment is a conveyance of title to a patent or some portion thereof.
Patents are made assignable by federal statute which requires that an
assignment be in writing and recorded in the Patent Office in order
for it to be good in favor of the assignee as against any subsequent
assignee for value without notice.54 A patentee can assign: (1) the
whole patent, i.e., the exclusive right to make, use, and sell the inven-
51. E.g., Smith v. Kansas City Title & T. Co., 225 U.S. 180 (1921).
52. E.g., Shoshone Min. Co. v. Rutter, 177 U.S. 505 (1900).
53. See generally 4 A. DELLE.R, VALKER ON PATENTS 376-80 (2d ed. 1965).
54. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (1964).
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tion in the United States; or (2) an undivided part or share of that
exclusive right; or (3) the exclusive right to make, use, and sell the
invention in a "special part of the United States." 5
A license, on the other hand, is a contract whereby the owner of the
patent (the patentee or an assignee) allows the licensee to make, use,
or sell the invention. The federal patent laws do not directly deal with
licenses and impose no formal requirements on them. The principal
difference between the status of a licensee and an assignee is that an
assignee may sue a third party for infringement of the patent whereas
a licensee may not. 6 The name which the parties give an instrument
is generally not conclusive, and a "license" may be considered an
"assignment" if it fits within one of the three categories of assign-
ments.5
7
In practice, licenses and assignments tend to take similar forms.
The licensor or assignor often obtains a covenant on the part of the
licensee or assignee to pay compensation, generally in the form of a
royalty, and protects that covenant by a condition subsequent for non-
payment of the royalty. 8 Upon the licensee/assignee's failure to pay
royalties, the licensee/assignee can be held for breach of covenant and
the contract can be terminated by the licensor in the case of a license,
or the title may revert to the assignor in the case of an assignment.
Covenants or conditions, other than those relating to consideration,
may also be imposed by the licensor or assignor. However, certain
covenants or conditions, such as those fixing the price which the
licensee must charge in vending the patented product, may run afoul
of the federal anti-trust laws."
Litigation over patent licenses or assignments normally arises when
one party asserts that the other has breached the terms of the agree-
ment. The courts were early faced with the question of whether such
litigation "arises under" the federal patent laws, thereby being within
55. Id.
56. E.g., Rawlings v. National Molasses Co., 394 F.2d 645 (9th Cir. 1968); 4 A.
DELLER, supra note 53, at 377. One exception is apparently that an exclusive licensee can
sue the licensor for infringement where the licensor, in breach of the exclusive license,
makes, uses, or sells the patented product or process or authorizes others to do so. Ex-
celsior Wooden Pipe Co. v. Pacific Bridge Co., 185 U.S. 282 (1902); James C. Wilborn
& Sons, Inc. v. Brandex Tilt Sash, Inc., 380 F.2d 44 (7th Cir. 1967).
57. 4 A. Dar.xa, supra note 53, at 378.
58. Id. at 373-74, 654-57.
59. See White & Staubitz, The Antitrust Attack on Patent Licensing-From Light
Bulbs to Lear Jets, 25 Bus. LAw. 1725 (1970).
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the exclusive cognizance of the federal courts. The answer which they
devised strictly conforms to the Holmes test of "arising under" juris-
diction and can be best described as "Pleader's Choice." 60
Assume a licensor feels that his licensee is breaching the license
agreement but his licensee disagrees. The licensor has a choice of
forums. If he wishes to sue his licensee in state court, he need only
allege a breach of covenant by the licensee. The action is then said to
arise under state contract law, not federal patent law.61 The action is
not within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts and in fact
can be brought in or removed to federal court only if there is diversity
of citizenship between the licensor and licensee. If, on the other hand,
the licensor wishes to sue his licensee in federal court, he need only
allege that the licensee is infringing his (the licensor's) patent. In
other words, he can waive the action for breach of covenant, declare a
forfeiture for failure of a condition subsequent, and sue for the statu-
tory tort of infringement.62 Since the action is for infringement, it lies
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts.63
60. See generally L. A_ DsUR, PATENT LiTIGATION 1-12 (1933).
The classic statement of the "Pleader's Choice" doctrine is by Justice Frankfurter in
Pan American Petroleum Corp. v. Superior Court, 366 U.S. 656, 662 (1961):
But questions of exclusive federal jurisdiction and ouster of jurisdiction of state
courts are, under existing jurisdictional legislation, not determined by ultimate
substantive issues of federal law. The answers depend on the particular claims a
suitor makes in a state court-on how he casts his action. Since "the party who brings
a suit is master to decide what law he will rely upon" . . . the complaints in the
Delaware Superior Court determine the nature of the suits before it.
61. Wilson v. Sanford, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 99 (1850).
62. The licensor may not have such Pleader's Choice if, through his (or his lawyer's)
lack of foresight, he fails to make the desired licensee conduct both a covenant and a
condition. If it is solely a condition, he can only declare a forfeiture and sue for infringe-
ment in federal court. If it is solely a covenant, he can only sue for breach of covenant
in state court, See Baxter, Legal Restrictions on Exploitation of the Patent Monopoly:
An Economic Analysis, 76 YALE L.J. 267, 278-79 (1966). However, even this dichotomy
between conditions and covenants is not consistently adhered to. Decisions seem to allow
a licensor to bring an action in state court for a judicial declaration of forfeiture. Wilson
v. Sanford, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 99 (1850). The line between such an action and one
for infringement is a fine one requiring careful pleading. Compare James C. Wilborn &
Sons, Inc. v. Brandex Tilt Sash, Inc., 380 F.2d 44 (7th Cir. 1967), with Laning v. National
Ribbon & Carbon Paper Mfg. Co., 125 F.2d 565 (7th Cir. 1942). Commentators have
questioned whether the state court, after declaring a forfeiture, ought to be able to go
on and enjoin future use of the invention. 36 CoNr. B.J. 281, 287 (1962); 31 CoLum.
L. R v. 461, 463-64 (1931); cf. M. NimMER, supra note 2, at 568 n.10. Such relief seems
indistinguishable, pragmatically and conceptually, from an injunction against infringement
(which is supposed to be available only from a federal court). The decisions seem to
allow such injunctions, however, primarily on a sort of "ancillary" jurisdiction theory
E.g., H.J. Heinz Co. v. Superior Court, 42 Cal. 2d 227, 266 P.2d 5 (1954).
63. Healy v. Sea Gull Specialty Co., 237 U.S. 479 (1915); Henry v. A.B. Dick Co.,
224 U.S. 1 (1912)
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Whichever choice the licensor makes, the actual litigation will take
the same shape. In either the state or the federal litigation the primary
issue will be the licensee's breach. The licensee will assert the defense
of license or consent to the licensor's infringement action (since in-
fringement is only the unconsented use, sale, or manufacture of a
patented invention). In turn, the licensor by way of replication will
assert that the license is no defense because it has been properly
terminated by the licensor because of the licensee's breach.
The pattern is duplicated with assignments. As noted above, an as-
signor frequently includes in the assignment of title to the patent or a
portion thereof a reverter or condition subsequent. If the assignor and
assignee disagree as to whether the reverter or condition subsequent
has occurred, the assignor again has a choice of forums. If he wishes
to sue in state court, he may bring the equivalent of an action to quiet
his reverted title to the patent. The action is then said to arise under
state law.64 Property rights in patents are governed generally by state
law once they have been issued by the federal government. An action
concerning only property rights in patents is not an action "arising
under" the federal patent laws 5 and is therefore not within the ex-
clusive jurisdiction of the federal courts. If, on the other hand, the
assignor wishes to sue in federal court, he need only allege that the
assignee is infringing his (the assignor's) patent. In other words, the
assignor can proceed on the theory that his titie reverted automatically
and without judicial declaration.6"
Again, whichever choice the assignor makes, the actual litigation will
take the same shape. In both cases, the construction and application
of the assignment will be the central issue. In the state litigation, the
title question is put directly in issue by the assignor's complaint, in the
64. Luckett v. Delpark, Inc., 270 U.S. 496 (1926) (federal court lacks jurisdiction
over action for declaration of reversion of title) ; Pendleton v. Ferguson, 15 Cal. 2d 319,
101 P.2d 81 (1940) (state court has jurisdiction over action to quiet title).
65. New Marshall Engine Co. v. Marshall Engine Co., 223 U.S. 473, 480 (1912)
(state court has jurisdiction to grant specific performance of a contract to assign a
patent); Hold Stitch Fabric Mach. Co. v. May Hosiery Mills, 184 Tenn. 19, 195 S.W.2d
18, cert. denied, 329 U.S. 759 (1946); Olds v. Ray-Dio-Ray Cory, 160 Wash. 35, 294
P. 579 (1930). Cf. Joy v. St. Louis, 201 U.S. 332, 340 (1906): "[A] claim that the title
comes from the United States does not, for that reason merely, raise a Federal question."
66. Pleader's Choice also exists when the parties are reversed. An assignee or exclusive
licensee claiming that his assignor or licensor has breached the terms of the assignment
or license can opt either to sue in state court for breach of contract or in federal court
for infringement. See Amdur, Patent Litigation in -Federal and State Courts, 2 Gao.
WAsl. L. REv. 35, 46-49 (1933).
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federal litigation, the title question will be put in issue by the defen-
dant who will contest the assignor's title and therefore his standing
to sue for infringement.
B. The Tort Modes
Disputes over patents, of course, arise between parties who are not
in privity of contract through an assignment or a license agreement.
The most obvious instance is where one party is allegedly a "naked"
infringer, i.e., he is making, using, or selling the invention or discovery
without the permission of the owner of the patentY Another instance
is where one party is allegedly a "contributory" infringer, i.e., he is
selling a non-infringing component, material, or apparatus "especially
made or adapted" for use by another in an infringement of a patent.68
Patent controversies also arise over disputed words as well as disputed
deeds.69 A patent owner may make broad and possibly incorrect claims
that certain acts by others will infringe his patent. Such "threats" may
have a deterrent effect to the injury of other interested parties. On the
other hand, a person may make broad and possibly incorrect claims
that certain deeds by others will not infringe a patent or that the
patent is invalid. Such claims may have an adverse effect on the
patent owner's ability to secure the full economic benefit of his patent.
The jurisdictional problem is, of course, whether litigation over
these various kinds of controversies "arises under" the federal patent
laws so as to be within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts.
To a surprisingly large extent, the answer may be "Pleader's Choice,"
as in license and assignment cases.
Take the problem of the patent owner who is making broad claims
about the scope and application of his patent. He may claim, for
example, that the products of a competitor infringe his patent and so
notify both the competitor and potential customers of the competitor.
As a result of the overt or covert threats of infringement suits, the
customers may be deterred from dealing with the competitor for fear
of being liable for infringement. The aggrieved competitor has a choice
of remedies and a choice of forums. He can sue for damages in state
67. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1964).
68. 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (1964).
69. Federal Tel. & Radio Corp. v. Associated Tel. & Tel. Co., 169 F.2d 1012, 1015 (3d
Cir. 1948).
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court for trade libel and unfair competition. The leading case, Amer-
ican Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co.,7 clearly holds that such
an action arises under state law and is cognizable only in the state
courts absent diversity of citizenship. Alternatively, the aggrieved
competitor can seek a declaratory judgment that his products do not
infringe the defendant's patents or that the defendant's patents are
invalid.7 1 Such an action "arises under" the patent laws and is ex-
clusively cognizable in the federal courts. 72
However, neither the remedies nor the issues in the alternative state
and federal litigations will be entirely the same. In the former the
plaintiff can seek damages; in the latter, declaratory relief and perhaps
an injunction.73 In the federal declaratory judgment action, the validity
and infringement of the defendant's patents are the primary issues. In
the unfair competition action, validity and infringement are not
directly in issue at all. The patent owner can claim a qualified priv-
ilege in the state trade libel action and thereby not be held liable for
damages if his claims of infringement were made in a reasonable
manner and from a good faith (though erroneous) belief that his
patent was valid and that plaintiff's products did infringe that patent.7"
The ultimate issues are thus the defendant's good faith and the
reasonableness of his methods.
The more difficult problem arises when a person is making broad
and possibly incorrect claims that certain products or processes do not
infringe a patent and the patent owner seeks judicial relief. The patent
owner generally will have a remedy in federal court. He can sue on the
theory that the defendant is actively inducing infringement of his
patent and is therefore liable as an infringer.7" The action is clearly
70. 241U.S. 257 (1916).
71. See generally Krieger, The Federal Declaratory Judgment Act As It Applies to
Patent Actions, 13 IDEA 668 (1970).
72. See Mishkin, supra note 30, at 179 n.102.
73. The plaintiff may, however, be able to join a state unfair competition claim for
damages to his federal declaratory claim under the pendent jurisdiction doctrine. Id.
74. Dynamic Instrument Corp. v. Fedtro, Inc., 153 U.S.P.Q. 441 (E.D.N.Y. 1967);
Kemart Corp. v. Printing Arts Research Laboratories, Inc., 146 F. Supp. 21 (S.D. Cal.
1956); 2 R. CALmmAN, UNFAmR Coi ME=oN TRADEMARxS AND MONOPOLIES 253-68
(1968); 72 HARV. L. REv. 328, 353-54 (1958). The privilege is always said to be a matter
of state law. However, federal patent policy should be the basis of an equal defense
under federal law should some state law fail to recognize such a privilege.
75. 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (1964). The patent owner must show knowing inducement of
activity by another that would constitute direct infringement. Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible
Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 341 (1961); Electronized Chem. Corp. v. Rad-Mat,
Inc., 288 F. Supp. 781-(D. Md. 1968).
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one "arising under" the federal patent laws and within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the federal courts. It is also possible that the patent
owner can seek a federal declaratory judgment that the actions which
the defendant advocates do in fact constitute an infringement of his
valid patent.70 Can, however, the patent owner exercise "Pleader's
Choice" and sue in state court under state law? This is the question
that Koratron Company v. Deering Milliken, Inc. seems to answer in
the affirmative.
IV. THE KORATRON CASE 77
The Koratron Company filed a complaint in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of California, naming Deering
Milliken, Inc. as defendant. The controversy between the parties
centered on Koratron's process patents on the manufacture of perma-
nent press garments. Koratron had licensed 200 garment makers to
use its patents upon the payment of royalties. Milliken manufactures
various fabrics. In its complaint, Koratron alleged that Milliken was
representing to Koratron's licensees and to other garment makers that
they could use Milliken's fabrics to make permanent press garments
without infringing Koratron's process patents. Koratron alleged that
such representations were false and sought declaratory, injunctive, and
monetary relief, including $5 million in punitive damages.
One day after Koratron filed its complaint, Milliken filed a com-
plaint in the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York, naming Koratron as the defendant. Milliken sought a
declaratory judgment that Koratron's patents were invalid or, alterna-
tively, not infringed by the use of Milliken fabrics to make permanent
press garments. Meanwhile, Milliken appeared in the California action
and moved alternatively that it be (1) dismissed for improper venue,
(2) stayed pending the resolution of the action in New York, or
(3) transferred to New York for consolidation. The District Court in
76. All the reported attempts by patent owners to seek declaratory judgments have
been subject to discretionary dismissals. Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. United States
Chem., 140 F.2d 47 (4th Cir. 1944); Proler Street Corp. v. Luria Bros. & Co., 225 F.
Supp. 412 (S.D. Texas 1964). No case has categorically denied the availability of the
remedy, however. Cf. Electronized Chem. Corp. v. Rad-Mat, Inc., 288 F. Supp. 781,
785 n.1 (D. Md. 1968).
77. Koratron Co. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 418 F.2d 1314 (9th Cir. 1969).
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California denied Milliken's motion, and an interlocutory appeal was
taken by Miflliken to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit. The New York action was stayed pending the appeal.
The issue presented to the appeals court was thus one of venue, not
the subject matter jurisdiction of state and federal courts over patent
matters. Venue in patent infringement actions is governed by 28 U.S.C.
§ 1400(b), which provides that infringement actions can only be
brought (1) in the district where the defendant resides, or (2) in a
district where the defendant has committed acts of infringement and
has a regular and established place of business.
By contrast, the general venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a), pro-
vides that a federal court action against a corporation can be main-
tained "in any judicial district in which it is incorporated or licensed
to do business or is doing business.17s Milliken argued that Koratron's
action was for infringement and governed by § 1400(b) and that
Milliken neither "resided" in California nor had it committed any act
of infringement in California. It argued that the action should be dis-
missed for improper venue or transferred to New York where venue
allegedly was proper. Koratron argued that its action was not for
patent infringement and indeed did not "arise under" the federal
patent laws at all. Rather it maintained that it had pleaded its action
as arising under the California law of unfair competition, to wit, the
torts of interference with contract (as to Milliken's representations to
Koratron's licensees) and interference with prospective economic
advantage (as to Milliken's representations to garment makers who
were not but might otherwise become licensees of Koratron). Koratron
argued that federal jurisdiction was founded solely upon the diversity
of citizenship between the parties and that venue was proper under
28 U.S.C. § 1391(a) in the Northern District of California since
Milliken had a sales office there.
Although the immediate issue before the Ninth Circuit was one of
venue, the manner in which it was resolved is directly relevant to the
question of the division of jurisdiction between state and federal courts
over patent controversies because the court accepted Koratron's broad
78. The rationale for restrictive venue in infringement actions is obscure and may
simply be an historical anomaly. See, 72 HARV. L. REv. 328 at 332-33 (1958). See generally
1 J. MooRE, FFDEAL PRACricE 1625-35 (1964). The ALI proposes to broaden venue in
infringement actions. ALI STuny, supra note 30, at 30-31, 220-21.
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argument that the action did not arise under the federal patent laws.
It therefore held that a fortiori the action was not an infringement
action governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b). The clear implication is that
Koratron could have brought its action, as it was pleaded, in the
California state courts, and, absent diversity of citizenship, only in the
California state courts.
The dismissal by the district court of Milliken's motion alternatively
to dismiss, stay or transfer presented the circuit court with a wide
spectrum of alternative dispositions. It could have:
(1) held that Koratron's action was in substance one for infringe-
ment, and
(a) reversed and ordered the action dismissed or transferred for
improper venue under § 1400(b); or
(b) affirmed because venue was still proper under § 1400(b); or
(2) held that Koratron's action was one arising under the patent
laws but not one for infringement and therefore affirmed the denial of
Milliken's motions on the basis of § 1400(b); or
(3) held that Koratron's action did not arise under federal law and
(a) reversed and ordered the action stayed pending disposition of
Milliken's federal declaratory judgment action in New York; or
(b) affirmed.
The parties urged primarily the extremes-Milliken arguing that
Koratron's action was for infringement and should therefore be dis-
missed or transferred for improper venue [(1)(a)], and Koratron
arguing that its action did not arise under federal law so that Milli-
ken's motion was rightly denied [(3)(b)]. 9
The better view of the plaintiff's action in Koratron is that it is in
fact one arising under the federal patent statutes and within the ex-
clusive cognizance of the federal courts. It is interesting to note, how-
ever, that the court could have gone either way on the venue question
regardless of how it resolved the "arising under" problem. For
example, there was ample room for adopting alternative (1) (b) (that
79. Koratron did urge alternatives (1) (b) and (2) as alternative grounds for affirm-
ing. Brief for Appellee at 20-21, 17-18, Koratron Co. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 418 F.2d
1314 (9th Cir. 1969).
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Koratron's action was for infringement and that venue was proper).
Koratron was attempting to rely on the law of California which
certainly indicates that it thought that Milliken's alleged tortious acts
had some contact with California. That, together with Milliken's sales
office in the Northern District of California, may have fulfilled the
requirements of the second part of § 1400(b). At least, the court could
have remanded the case for a finding on the issue since no such finding
was made by the court below.
The court could also have adopted alternative (2) (that the action
arose under the federal patent laws but was not an infringement action
governed by the special venue provision, § 1400(b)). If Koratron's
action had been viewed as one for a declaratory judgment, venue in
California could have been upheld by the consistent line of authority
that a declaratory judgment action as to patent matters is not an
infringement action governed by § 1400(b).8 0 Venue in such a de-
claratory judgment action is governed by the general statute, § 1391
(a). The problem with this alternative, however, is that the cases
holding § 1400(b) inapplicable to declaratory judgments have involved
actions by third parties against patent owners seeking a declaration of
noninfringement or invalidity of the patent." Since the restrictive
venue provision of § 1400(b) is presumably for the benefit of an
alleged infringer, it makes sense not to apply it where the infringer is
seeking relief. The same cannot be said when the patent owner seeks
a declaratory judgment as an alternative to a coercive infringement
action.82
Alternatives (1) (b) and (2) are attractive because the court could
have resolved the venue question the way it did without traversing the
delicate area of the division of jurisdiction between state and federal
courts. The court could have reasoned that even if the action arose
under federal law (without actually deciding that question), venue
was still proper in the Northern District of California. Koratron was
essentially a jousting match, between corporate litigants and their blue
ribbon counsel, to decide which federal court, California or New York,
would try an important patent litigation that clearly belonged in a
federal court. The court openly sanctions subversion of the narrow
80. E.g., General Tire & Rubber Co. v. Watkins, 326 F.2d 926 (4th Cir. 1964).
81. See generally cases cited in Krieger, supra note 71.
82. See cases cited in note 76, supra.
653
Washington Law Review
venue requirements of § 1400(b),83 perhaps because the policy behind
that statute is questionable." But the court should not have also
decided an important issue of state and federal court relations in the
process unless it was clearly necessary to do so.
In Koratron the question of whether the action arose under the
federal patent laws can be approached on several levels. First, at the
pleading level, it can be argued that even if Koratron had complete
pleader's choice of state or federal remedies it did not succeed in plead-
ing a state remedy. The court in Koratron stated:"
Koratron intended to plead its case as a common law action.
It strained out all patent infringement language from its plead-
ing. It did not seek treble damages and attorney's fees available
in a patent infringement suit; it sought compensatory and lump
sum punitive damages appropriate to a common law claim.
But the court overlooked Koratron's first prayer for relief which was
that the court "make and enter a judgment declaring the rights and
obligations of plaintiff Koratron and defendant Milliken.",,6 Specifi-
cally, Koratron sought a declaration as to the scope of its patent, i.e.,
whether the making of garments with Milliken's fabrics infringed
Koratron's patents. Koratron appended to its complaint a copy of its
patents as an exhibit. Did the court in Koratron really mean to sug-
gest that a state court has jurisdiction to entertain such a declaratory
action as to patent rights? At best, it would seem that Koratron
succeeded in pleading a federal action for declaratory relief (which
clearly does "arise under" federal law) along with a state action for
unfair competition.
Second, at the state law level, it is not at all clear that state unfair
competition law does or even can provide the kind of remedy which
83. Compare Bradford Novelty Co. v. Manheim, 156 F. Supp. 489, 492 (S.D.N.Y.
1957):
But the gravamen of the present complaint is patent infringement; unfair competi-
tion, if a separate cause of action at all, being a subsidiary issue dependent on the
prior determination of the action for patent infringement. . . .Since unfair competi-
tion can almost always be charged in a patent infringement action, if plaintiff were
to prevail in its argument, it would be a simple matter of pleading for a party to
evade the venue limitation imposed by § 1400. This Court will not be a party to
such an obvious subversion. ...
84. See note 78, supra.
85. 418 F.2d at 1317.
86. Original complaint filed June 19, 1967, reproduced in Brief for Appellant at
4a-8a, Koratron Co. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 418 F.2d 1314 (9th Cir. 1969).
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Koratron sought as an alternative to a contributory infringement ac-
tion. Thus, arguably, there was no state remedy that Koratron, as the
pleader, could elect. Koratron's complaint contained two different
allegations. On the one hand, there were charges of bad faith and op-
pressive tactics by Milliken toward Koratron.87 State unfair competi-
tion law clearly can and does provide a remedy for such conduct. 8
That the oppressive conduct is directed toward the plaintiff's federal
patent rights and related contracts is immaterial. On the other hand,
Koratron's complaint also charged that Milliken had been verbally
claiming that a certain product or process did not fall within the scope
of any valid patent owned by Koratron and that that claim was false
and caused economic injury to Koratron.89 It is difficult to see what
role state law and policy can play in the resolution of such a charge. 90
If Milliken's words were sufficient to constitute contributory infringe-
ment, federal law provides the remedy. If those words did not con-
stitute actionable infringement, e.g., because they did not constitute
"active inducement" of infringement under the circumstances, could
state law still provide a remedy? One would think not. Milliken should
be privileged to make assertions about its federal rights (in this case,
the rights to be free from the claims of an invalid patent or from the
87. Miliken has demanded of Koratron that it acknowledges in writing that the
making of garments in the manner defined by the claims of the patent from .. .
[Milliken's] fabrics falls without the scope of the patent and threatens that unless
Koratron make such acknowledgment Milliken will publicly advise Koratron's
licensees that they may use . .. [Milliken's] fabrics . . . without incurring any
obligation to Koratron ....
: : : in committing the conduct alleged above, Miliken is guilty of oppression.
Id. at 6a-7a (emphasis supplied).
88. Competition by means of intimidation, violence, defamation or misrepresentation
has long been actionable at common law. See RESTATEMMNT (SEcoN) op ToRTs, Explan-
atory Notes § 766A, comment e at 53-54 (Tent. Draft No. 14, 1969).
89. Brief for Appellant at Sa-6a:
Milliken claims ... that the scope of the patent is such that by using said fabrics
Koratron's patent licensees will escape the obligation to Koratron .... Koratron
claims that the scope of the patent is such that the use of said fabrics .. .does
not immunize its patent licensees....
90. Thus, in federal actions where the plaintiff joins a claim for patent infringement
with a claim for unfair competition, the courts routinely dismiss the unfair competition
claim if it alleges no facts (such as fraud or breach of confidence) beyond those that
show simple infringement. 1 R. CAL rer, supra note 74, at 511-22 (and cases cited
therein). On the other hand, where the plaintiff complains of conduct beyond infringe-
ment-such as breach of a confidential relationship-state law clearly does have an
independent role. See Kamin v. Kuhnau, 232 Ore. 139, 374 P.2d 912, 922 (1962). State
law protects the confidential relationship, not the plaintiff's right to derive economic
benefits from the exclusive right to make, use or sell a certain idea.
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overly broad claims of a patent owner) so long as they are made in
good faith and not accompanied by oppressive conduct."
The court in Koratron rejected the argument that any unfair com-
petition remedy that Koratron, as a patent owner, might assert had
been preempted by the substantive federal patent law. 2 Its reasoning
was that the state remedies for interference with contractual and pro-
spective advantage are not inconsistent with substantive federal patent
law. However, this argument completely ignores the policy of federal
court exclusively behind the patent jurisdictional statute. 3 Even allow-
ing a state remedy, enforceable in state court, that is consistent with
federal substantive patent law offends the policy of jurisdictional ex-
clusivity insofar as the state remedy merely duplicates a federal
patent remedy.
The answer to this objection may be that the lack of a state remedy
is not a jurisdictional problem but one on the merits. If Koratron
maintains its state law theory after the venue fight (which is doubtful)
and cannot find a state remedy, it simply may lose. However, the lack
of a state remedy should still be considered in interpreting the com-
plaint to determine under what law, state or federal, the plaintiff's
action arises.
In short the court erred in failing to hold that Koratron had pleaded
a claim for contributory infringement or at least a claim for declaratory
relief plus a state unfair competition claim. The court candidly
recognized the contributory infringement claim: 94
Because Koratron would have to prove the basic elements of a
contributory infringement claim in order to succeed in its tort
claim, it must realistically be admitted that the gravamen of the
complaint is contributory negligence.
The court should have acted upon its realistic admission and held that
the action arose under federal law, thereby recognizing that state law
has no role in providing a remedy for Milliken's alleged conduct other
than that relating to alleged bad faith or oppressive conduct for which
there is no specialized federal patent remedy. State law at best merely
91. Such a privilege is correlative to the patent owner's privilege to make good faith
(though in fact erroneous) claims about the scope of his federal patent rights. See note
74 and accompanying text, supra.
92. 418 F.2d at 1318.
93. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1964).
94. 418 F.2d at 1316.
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duplicates the federal remedy that Congress has decreed to be available
only from the federal courts? 5
Given the Koratron holding, it is interesting to speculate about what
sort of action is left within the exclusive patent jurisdiction of the
federal courts. Every act of contributory infringement can presumably
be pleaded as an interference with prospective advantage. What then
is the status of pure, unadulterated, unilateral and nonverbal infringe-
ment? Can it be pleaded under a theory of bad faith refusal to deal
with the patent owner on a royalty basis? 6 Who knows?
If the Koratron court was right, or at least compelled by precedent
to hold that Koratron's action arose under state law, its view under-
scores a curious and disturbing anomaly in the law of federal jurisdic-
tion. In the face of an apparently decisive declaration of Congressional
policy dating back at least to 1836 that patent cases, especially those
involving the validity of a patent, should be litigated only in federal
court, the courts have consistently recognized artful pleading and
lawyerlike ingenuity and allowed all manner of cases concerning
patents to be brought in state courts. Once brought in state court, they
cannot be removed by the defendant to a federal court absent diversity
of citizenship. A defendant can remove only if the action is within the
original jurisdiction of a federal court.97 Such will not be the case if the
case if the action is not deemed to "arise under" the federal patent
laws and the parties are both citizens of the same state. It is time to
face that anomaly squarely and assess the damage done.
V. THE STATE COURTS AND PATENT QUESTIONS: AN
ASSESSMENT
Courts and commentators alike reiterate the point that the federal
courts have exclusive jurisdiction only over cases "arising under" the
95. Professors Hart and Wechsler poignantly query: "The decisions obviously permit
a patent owner in many situations to exercise a choice whether to resort to a federal or
a state court. Do they permit him to do this without any variation in substance of the
claim made or relief secured?" H. HART & H. WEcSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SysEm 757 (1953). In the same vein, Professor Currie asks: "What is the
point of an 'exclusive' jurisdiction that the plaintiff can avoid by artful pleading?" D.
CuRRiE, FEDERAL COURTS CASES AND MATERIALS 360 (1968).
96. The rhetorical question is somewhat misleading, since state tort law has not (yet)
recognized any tort of unilateral refusal to deal. 1 F. HARPER & F. JAmms, Tim LAW OP
TORTS 521 (1956).
97. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1964).
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federal patent laws and not over patent questions. The state courts
are said to be fully competent to adjudicate patent questions that
come before them in contract, property and tort cases so long as the
case itself does not arise under the patent laws. While this may be a
correct statement of the law, it is not a fully accurate characterization
of actual practice, at least, not until very recently.
A. Infringement Issues
Since 1790 two basic federal patent law issues, infringement and
validity of patents, have regularly arisen in litigation. The resolution
of both issues involves federal interests of enormous importance. A
patent is a legalized monopoly. As such, it is the principal legal
exception to our national policy of free economic competition. 9 In-
fringement issues are of great importance because they concern the
scope of federally sanctioned monoplies. The resolution of an in-
fringement issue involves the construction of the claims of the patent
itself and an application of those claims to the alleged infringer's
conduct.100 The judge resolving an infringement issue must neces-
sarily delve into technical matters, but he must also be sensitive to
underlying policies in choosing between broad and narrow construc-
tions of patent claims. For these reasons, Congress has found it desir-
able to channel infringement litigation into the federal judiciary which
presumably possesses some technical expertise in the construction of
patent claims and also a heightened sensitivity to federal patent
policy.
However, it is clear that state courts do in fact regularly pass upon
questions of infringement in contract cases.' In the typical case a
patent owner authorizes a licensee to make, use, or sell the invention
upon payment of royalty. Later the licensee makes, uses or sells a
process or product without paying royalty. If the patent owner opts
to sue in state court for breach of contract instead of in federal court
for infringement, 02 the state courts treat the issue of whether the
98. E.g., Pratt v. Paris Gas Light & Coke Co., 168 U.S. 255, 259 (1897); Rogers v.
Hensley, 194 Cal. App. 2d 486, 14 Cal. Rptr. 870 (1961). 3 A. DELLER, WALxER oN
PATENTS 1602-03 (1937).
99. See generally P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 318-24 (1967).
100. See generally 3 A. DELLER, supra note 98, at 1680-775.
101. E.g., Osgood Panel & Veneer Co. v. Osgood, 166 Wash. 315, 6 P.2d 661 (1932).
102. See text accompanying notes 58-63, supra.
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licensee has breached the contract as identical to the issue of whether
the licensee would have been infringing the licensor's patent had no
contract been in the picture. Thus, they cite and rely upon federal
infringement precedents. 03 In turn, the federal courts give res judi-
cata effect to a state court's resolution of the breach-of-contract issue
should a patent owner, unsuccessful in a state action, sue in federal
court for infringement. 4
Allowing state courts to adjudicate infringement issues in contract
actions is surely inconsistent with the congressional policy of confin-
ing infringement actions to federal courts. 05 The state court presum-
ably lacks the expertise of a federal court, and hence its decision may
be less "reliable" in an absolute sense. A less reliable decision may be
considered unfair to a defendant who is deprived of a federal forum.
But the effect of a wrong decision by a state court is minimized be-
cause the decision primarily affects only the parties before the court.
The decision will usually have only marginal relevance to the question
of whether other persons are infringing the contested patent.
B. Validity Issues
While the resolution of infringement issues is of great importance
to federal patent and economic policies, the resolution of validity
issues is of even greater importance. A validity question is a direct
confrontation with the legality of the federally-granted patent monop-
oly. Letters patent are issued for an invention only if the applicant
is the first inventor'0 6 and his invention meets the statutorily and
judicially defined standards of novelty,'07 usefulness, 08 and non-obvi-
ousness. 0 9 Once letters patent have been issued by the Patent Office,
the patent is deemed by statute to be prima facie valid." 0 A defendant
in an infringement action can, however, escape liability by proving
103. E.g., American Photocopy Equip. Co. v. Ampto, Inc., 82 N.J. Super. 531, 198
A.2d 469 (1964).
104. Vanderveer v. Erie Malleable Iron Co., 238 F.2d 510 (3d Cir. 1956); 57 COLUM.
L. Rv. 585 (1957).
105. See H. HART & H. WECHSrxR, supra note 95, at 757; 72 HARv. L. REV. 328 at
330 (1958).
106. 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) (1964).
107. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102 (1964).
108. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1964); Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519 (1966).
109. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1964); .Graham v. John Deere Co;, 383 U.S. 1 (1966);
Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248 (1851).
110. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (1964) ; -ee text.accompanying note 14, su'ra. -
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that in fact the plaintiff's patent is invalid because it does not meet
the standards of novelty, usefulness, or non-obviousness.
Adjudication of patent validity involves not only a comprehension
of extremely technical matters in diverse scientific and engineering
fields but also an acute sensitivity to the prevailing social, economic
and political attitudes of the country. Empirical studies have shown
that judicial attitudes toward validity questions have varied sharply
in different periods of our history. One commentator has concluded:"'
[I]n periods of high satisfaction with the performance of indus-
try there has been no popular reluctance to reward innovating
activity in appropriate ways, including assurance of reasonable
patent protection. Conversely, in periods of dissatisfaction with
the functioning of business as a supplier of reasonably priced
goods, popular sentiment has tended to demand curtailment of its
special franchises, rewards and prerequisites. Sensitivity of
judges to these tides of general opinion has been reflected in
variances in the severity of their attitude toward patent claim-
ants.
Although this conclusion is meant to be factual, a normative judgment
can be added to it. In deciding validity issues, the judiciary should be
sensitive to prevailing attitudes toward inventive activity and its
proper reward. Jurisdictional rules should channel validity adjudica-
tions to the federal judiciary, since it is most apt to be in full empathy
with national policy on patents and economic competition.
Unlike infringement questions, it is not clear that state courts have
ever adjudicated any significant number of patent validity questions.
Courts and commentators broadly proclaim that state courts are com-
petent to adjudicate validity questions so long as the case itself does
not "arise under" the federal patent laws. 112 But it is a frustrating
and fruitless task to search for reported appellate opinions in which a
state court actually has passed upon the validity of a patent."3 There
are very, very few." 4
111. MVlayers, The United States Patent System in Historical Perspective, 3 PAT.,
T.M. & COPYRIGHT J. RESEARCH & EDUCATION 33, 50-51 (1959).
112. See note 98, supra.
113. "The ratio [of federal court validity adjudications to state court validity ad-
judications] has been estimated at 100 to 1. Interview with patent lawyer, Boston,
Mass., Feb. 29, 1956. The Fifth Decennial Digest notes only two cases in the state courts
in which the issue of invalidity was adjudicated." 70 HARv. L. REv. 509, 514 n.37 (1957).
114. E.g., Armstrong Co. v. Shell Co., 98 Cal. App. 769, 277 P. 887 (1929).
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One reason for the dearth of actual state court adjudications of
validity questions is that many cases involving patent questions, but
not deemed to "arise under" the patent laws, are still brought in or
removed to federal court on the basis of the diversity of citizenship
of the parties. Such was the case in Koratron. However, diversity of
citizenship should be a neutral factor, since it bears no relation to
the need for a federal forum for the adjudication of questions of fed-
eral patent law. Another important reason is the fact that, until
recently, validity questions rarely came up in any litigation except
infringement actions which have been brought in federal court.
Consider the tort cases. In the common situations where a person
brings a trade libel or unfair competition action in a state court against
a patent owner who is making broad and allegedly erroneous claims
that the plaintiff's activities constitute infringement, the patent's
validity should not be directly in issue. Once the defendant demon-
strates his good faith and the reasonableness of the means he has
used in making his claims, that should be the end of the action." 5 A
patent owner is privileged to make good faith claims about his rights
under federal law. He cannot be held liable for damages under state
law simply because his patent is in fact invalid. American Well Works
Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co.," 6 the leading case allowing this kind of
suit to be brought in a state court as an unfair competition action,
assumes that the issue of the patent's validity might arise. However,
the above analysis indicates that assumption is wrong.
Koratron perhaps unwittingly forces the issue of a patent's validity
upon the court in the converse situation where a patent owner brings
an unfair competition action against a defendant for allegedly false
claims that a certain product or process does not infringe the owner's
patent. Koratron's action did not purport merely to challenge Milli-
ken's good faith in making the statement. It sought to establish the
categorical falsity of those statements. The issues of infringement
and validity will inevitably be put directly in issue just as they would
be in an action for infringement.
In the area of assignment and license cases, the general rule, prior
to 1969, was that a party privy to a patent license or assignment was
115. See text accompanying note 69, supra.
116. 241 U.S. 257 (1916).
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estopped by an express or implied covenant from contesting the valid-
ity of the underlying patent in any litigation arising out of the as-
signment or license." 7 Thus, when actions on patent licenses or assign-
ments were brought in state court, the issue of the validity of the
patent could not generally be raised.
This rule was decisively broken in 1969 by the Supreme Court's
decision in Lear, Inc. v. Adkins,"" the aggravating development men-
tioned at the beginning of this article. In Lear, a patentee brought an
action in the Superior Court of California against his licensee for an
alleged breach of a patent licensing agreement. The licensee defended
partly on the ground that the patent was invalid for lack of novelty
and also that the patentee had obtained his patent by committing a
fraud on the Patent Office. The California Supreme Court unani-
mously held that the licensee was estopped to contest the validity of
the patent."9 The United States Supreme Court reversed. Noting
that the estoppel rule had already been eroded by exceptions, 2 ° the
Court decided to jettison the rule itself. Its reasoning is persuasive.
It is common knowledge that many patents are issued by the Patent
Office that are subsequently determined to be invalid.' Until ruled
invalid, however, an issued patent continues to restrain free competi-
tion in the economic exploitation of ideas. Business entities, unable
or unwilling to undertake costly litigation challenging the validity of
a patent, refrain from engaging in infringing activity. 2 Licensees
are apt to be the class of persons with the greatest economic incentive
to engage in the costly litigation necessary to have a patent adjudi-
cated invalid, and the estoppel doctrine effectively eliminated licensees
117. 4 A. DELLER, WALKER ON PATENTS 435-39, 607-23 (2d ed. 1965).
118. 395 U.S. 653 (1969). See Note, The Decent Burial of Patent Licensee Estoppel,
1970 DuKE L.J. 375.
119. Adkins v. Lear, Inc., 67 Cal. 2d 882, 435 P.2d 321, 64 Cal. Rptr. 545 (1967).
120. E.g., MacGregor v. Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co., 329 U.S. 402 (1947)
(licensee not estopped to contest patent's validity when license contains illegal price-
fixing term).
121. The percentage of patents held invalid has varied over time. See Mayers,
supra note 111.
122. The deterrent effect of litigation expenses is mitigated somewhat by the provision
of the patent laws that a victorious defendant in an infringement action can recover
reasonable attorney fees. 35 U.S.C. § 285 (1964). Such fees are allowable only in
"exceptional cases" however, and generally the defendant must show some form of bad
faith or gross neglect on the part of the patent owner is bringing the groundless action.
E.g., Monolith Portland Midwest Co. v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 407 F.2d 288
(9th Cir. 1969).
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from serving as "private attorney generals" by securing a judicial
declaration that an apparently legal monopoly is in fact illegal. 2 '
The Court's decision in Lear has caused a decisive shift in the divi-
sion of jurisdiction over patent questions between state and federal
courts. The question of a patent's validity is now a potential issue in
literally every action brought in state court for breach of a patent
license or assignment 24
State court jurisdiction over patent validity questions is much less
acceptable than state court jurisdiction over infringement questions,
because the former does greater damage to the congressional policy
of confining patent cases to the federal courts. Validity adjudications
require a greater sensitivity to national policy-a sensitivity that only
the national judiciary can be assumed to possess. 125 Also, validity
123. As may be expected, those who favor greater patent protection are less than
happy with the results of the Lear case, since it undoubtedly will increase the already
large number of judicial invalidations of patents. This unhappiness has led to proposals
for legislative correction. Senator Scott introduced an amendment to Senate Bill 2756
that would have partially overruled Lear. Amdt. 578, S. 2756, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
The amendment provided in part:
(e) No assignor of a patent shall contest, directly or indirectly, the validity of the
patent, when asserted against him by his assignee or any owner of the patent
deriving title through the assignee, unless (1) the consideration involved has been
restored to, or for the benefit of, the first assignee, and (2) such assignor asserts
a ground for invalidity not reasonably available to him when the assignment was
made.
(f) No party to a license, immunity, or other express waiver under a patent shall,
unless consented to by all other parties thereto, contest the validity of the patent,
provided that any party who gives written notice that he unconditionally renounces
all future benefit from the license, immunity, or other waiver may then and there-
after contest the validity regardless of any contract to the contrary, but such re-
nunciation shall not operate to relieve the renouncing party from any performance
due piior to the renunciation.
124. It is possible, of course, that fewer plaintiffs will exercise Pleader's Choice in
favor of a state court. One of the advantages of a contract action over a federal court
infringement action is that invalidity can only be asserted in the latter. With that
advantage eliminated by Lear, there is less incentive for a plaintiff to base his action
on the contract rather than the tort of infringement.
125. The greater importance of validity issues in relation to infringement issues is
reflected in judicial pronouncements that when faced with the alternative defenses to
an infringement action of invalidity or noninfringement, the court should pass first on
the validity issue. Beckman Instruments, Inc. v. Chemtronics, Inc., 428 F.2d 555 (5th Cir.
1970). Such pronouncements are not universally assented to, however. See Fraser v. City
of San Antonio, 430 F.2d 1218, 1221-22 (5th Cir. 1970); Harries v. Air King Prods. Co.,
183 F.2d 158, 163 (2d Cir. 1950): "[lit is open to a court to proceed as is most
convenient, subject to the exception that, though the defendant has not infringed, claims
may be so evidently invalid that the court should so declare."
The importance of the validity question was also reflected in the holding of a recent
decision that such questions are "inappropriate for arbitration proceedings and should
be decided by a court of law." Beckman Instruments, Inc. v. Technical Dev. Corp.,
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adjudications, unlike infringement adjudications, have a direct impact
beyond the rights of parties involved. While a decision upholding a
patent is res judicata only as to the particular defendant,12 6 that deci-
sion will significantly deter others from challenging the patent monop-
oly. Furthermore, in Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University
of Illinois Foundation,s7 the Supreme Court held that a decision
holding a patent invalid is binding in rem, that is, in favor of all whom
the patentee might sue for infringement. 28
C. Proposed Solutions
There are good reasons for channeling the adjudications of im-
portant issues of federal patent law into the federal courts or at least
for providing a federal forum for such adjudications if either party
desires such a forum. Congress has apparently consistently recognized
these reasons by making federal jurisdiction over cases arising under
the patent laws exclusive of the state courts. Yet cases such as
Lear and Koratron necessarily imply that defendants may regularly
be forced to litigate important issues of federal patent law, including
crucial validity issues, in state courts if plaintiffs so choose and diver-
sity of citizenship is not present.
How can this anomaly be mitigated or eliminated? Two major
433 F.2d 55, 63 (7th Cir. 1970). Arguably, infringement questions would be "appropriate"
for arbitration.
126. Johns-Manville Corp. v. Cement Asbestos Prods. Co., 428 F.2d 1381 (5th Cir.
1970). See generally Note, In Rem Validity-A Two-Sided Coin, 59 GEo. L.J. 73 (1970).
The possibility of inconsistent rulings on the validity of a patent has led to efforts to
use the class action device. Such efforts have met with varying success. Research Corp. v.
Pfister Associated Growers, Inc., 301 F. Supp. 497 (N.D. Ill. 1969) (allowed); Techno-
graph Printed Circuits Ltd. v. Methode Electronics, Inc., 285 F. Supp. 714 (N.D. Ill.
1968) (allowed); Technitrol Inc. v. Control Data Corp., 164 U.S.P.Q. 552 (D. Md.
1970) (not allowed).
127. 91 Sup. Ct. 1434 (1971), overruling Triplett v. Lowell, 297 U.S. 638 (1936).
128. ALI STUDY, supra note 30, at 183. The ALI uses the public interest factor as
a justification for retaining exclusive federal jurisdiction over patent cases. Professor
Currie disagrees: "The ALI's notion that in patent ... cases there is a federal interest
transcending that of the parties is unconvincing; since nonparties would not be bound
by a state decision, it is hard to see how the monopoly could be undermined or ex-
tended by state litigation." Currie, The Federal Courts and the American Law Institute
-Part 11, 36 U. Cus. L. REv. 268, 280 (1969). The Blonder-Tongue decision expands
the scope of res judicata and strengthens the ALI position vis-h-vis Professor Currie.
However, I would adopt a middle ground between the two-using the public interest
factor as a justification for making federal court an available option to either party
in all cases in which a validity issue arises. That option is already available to the
plaintiff under the Pleader's Choice Rule. It should be made available to the defendant
also.
664
Vol. 46: 633, 1971
Patent Jurisdiction
proposals have been suggested. The first is to broaden the scope of
the statutory grant of federal jurisdiction over patent litigation. For
example, it has been suggested that federal jurisdiction could be ex-
tended by statute to all cases involving the licensing or assignment of
patent rights.129 To cover cases such as American Well Works and
Koratron, this should include all unfair competition actions concern-
ing the scope or validity of patent rights. This solution has much to
commend it. 80 Litigation involving patent licenses or assignments
often turns on questions of federal law, antitrust as well as patent
law'' The caseload burden on the federal courts is unlikely to be
significantly increased. Even if patent licenses and assignments con-
tinue to be governed in general by state contract law,1 2 there is no
evidence that the federal courts do not at present adequately deter-
mine and apply that law I" The plaintiff in a patent license or assign-
ment case can under present law opt for federal court by exercising
"Pleader's Choice."'3" This proposal would do no more than extend
that same choice of forum to the defendant by removal since cases
129. 72 HARv. L. Rzv. 328, 330 (1958).
130. Such an extension would dearly be within Congress' Article I powers to
confer original jurisdiction on the lower federal courts. It is generally conceded that the
scope of Article III arismg-under-federal-law-junsdiction is much broader than current
interpretation of the various statutory grants of arsing under jurisdiction. See text
accompanying notes 37-38, supra.
131. See Brulotte v. Thys Co., 374 U.S. 29 (1964) (patent license allowing the
collection of royalties beyond the expiration of a patent violates the federal antitrust
laws).
132 Licensing is one of the principal means by which a patent owner can exploit his
patent monopoly. How a patent owner exploits his monopoly is of vital concern to both
federal patent and federal antitrust policy. See Baxter, Legal Restrctions on £xploitation
of the Patent Monopoly: An Economw Analysts, 76 YALE LJ. 267 (1966). Given the
federal concern in patent licenses, it can be argued that Congress ought to authorize the
federal courts to develop a uniform federal contract law governing such licenses. See
§ 301(a), Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1964), Textile
Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.. 448 (1957) (federal courts authorized to
develop a uniform federal law of labor contracts).
For example, a licensee and licensor may wish to include a certain term of marginal
legality under the federal antitrust laws (such as a term allowing the licensor to control
the licensee's prices) in their agreement. Yet they may be deterred from including it
in the writing for fear of incurring legal sanctions should it later be determined to be
in fact illegal. See Royal Indus. v. St. Regis Paper Co., 420 F.2d 449 (9th Cir. 1969).
Arguably, federal policy should dictate that such a parol term be unenforceable even if
the state parol evidence rule would allow it to be proved. Allowing parol agreements of
marginal legality hinders enforcement of the antitrust laws.
133. See, e.g., Eastern Elec. Inc. v. Seeburg Corp., 427 F.2d 23 (2d Cir. 1970) (under
state contract law, assignee who promised to pay royalties upon use of the patent is
under no implied obligation to use the patent).
134. See text accompanying notes 60-66, supra.
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within the original jurisdiction of the federal courts are generally
removable to federal court by the defendant if originally brought in
state court.
It would seem to be of minor importance whether the expanded
federal jurisdiction over contract and tort cases involving patents
were made exclusive or concurrent. If the latter were chosen, a patent
case would stay in state court only if the plaintiff chose to bring it
there and the defendant chose not to remove. If both parties are con-
tent with the state court, perhaps the state court ought to be an
available forum."2 5
A more narrow solution would be to provide by statute that either
plaintiff or defendant could remove a state court action to federal
court if "a substantive issue of validity or infringement is presented
at any stage of the pleadings."'1 6 Thus, in the license and assignment
cases, if the licensor were to sue for breach of contract in state court
and the licensee to defend on the ground that the patent which is the
subject of the license is invalid, 8" either party could remove the
cause to a federal court. A patent license or assignment case would
remain in state court if no actual issue of patent law were raised and
there were no diversity of citizenship.
Both solutions have merit and would insure that important issues
of patent law would be channelled to the federal courts if either party
desired a federal forum. Both, however, are legislative solutions, and
legislative reform, especially in the area of federal jurisdiction, is often
slow in coming. Are there any fruitful avenues for judicial innova-
tion? One possibility is the discriminating use of the Federal Declara-
tory Judgment Act.138 It is interesting to note that both in Lear, a
patent license action in state court, and in Koratron, a diversity action
in federal court, the defendant filed a separate declaratory judgment
action in an appropriate federal court to have the plaintiff's patent
135. See note 128, supra.
136. 72 HARv. L. REv. 328 at 331 (1958). The ALI proposes to alter the Well-Pleaded
Complaint Rule and allow removal of a state action to federal court by either party on
the basis of a federal defense raised in the action. ALI STUDY, supra note 30, at 25-27,
188-94.
137. The licensee will not inevitably assert the defense of invalidity. The licensee
may have as great an interest in maintaining the patent monopoly as the licensor,
especially if the license is an exclusive one.
138. 28 U.S.C. § 2201-02 (1964).
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declared invalid or at least not infringed by the defendant.18 9 If the
federal courts were receptive to such actions, it might assure the
availability to the defendant, in an action begun in state court, of a
federal forum for the adjudication of important patent issues. Under
present law, the plaintiff can always opt for a federal forum. But if
he does not and sues in state court for unfair competition or for
breach of a license or assignment contract, the defendant could bring
a federal declaratory judgment action. The state action could be
stayed14 or, if necessary, the federal court could enjoin the original
plaintiff from proceeding with the state action. 41 The federal patent
issues would then be decided by a federal court. Unfortunately, the
case authority in lower federal courts does not support this proce-
dure. 42 Such actions are typically dismissed on the ground that the
federal issues may be resolved in the state court action for coercive
relief.143 These decisions should be reconsidered in the light of the
139. See Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Adkins, 330 F.2d 595 (9th Cir. 1964) and Koratron,
418 F.2d 1314.
140. Cf. Quaker State Oil Ref. Co. v. Talbot, 322 Pa. 155, 185 A. 586 (1936) (state
court action to enforce an assignment stayed pending resolution of a federal court action
for infringement).
141. One obstacle to such an injunction is 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1964) which provides:
"A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a
State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid
of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgment" (emphasis supplied). The
problem is whether the injunction can properly be viewed as "in aid of" the federal
court's declaratory judgment jurisdiction. Arguably, it cannot because to do so would
sanction a bootstrap subversion of § 2283. However, where there are strong reasons for
providing a party with a federal forum, § 2283 should not constitute an inflexible
barrier. Cf. Machesky v. Bizzell, 414 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1969). But see Atlantic Coast
Line R.R. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 398 U.S. 281 (1970).
142. Product Eng'r & Mfg. v. Barnes, 165 U.S.P.Q. 229 (10th Cir. 1970); Lear
Siegler, Inc. v. Adkins, 330 F.2d 595 (9th Cir. 1964); Chicago Fittings Corp. v. Howe,
164 U.S.P.Q. 658 (N.D. Ill. 1970). Cf. Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co., 316 U.S. 491, 495
(1942): "Ordinarily it would be uneconomical as well as vexatious for a federal court
to proceed in a declaratory judgment suit where another suit is pending in a state
court presenting the same issues, not governed by federal law, between the same parties."
(emphasis supplied). Compare the related problem where an infringement action is
commenced in one federal court and a declaratory judgment action is commenced in
another federal court. Kerotest Mfg. Co. v. C-O-Two Fire Equip., 342 U.S. 180 (1952).
143. An odd but commendable exception to this line of authority occurred in the
Lear-Adkins litigation. After the Supreme Court reversed and held that the defendant-
licensee could contest the validity of the patent in the state action for breach of contract,
the defendant moved to vacate the stay entered in his previous federal court action to
have the patent declared invalid. The federal district court vacated the stay after the
state court agreed that it would stay the action before it to allow a trial de novo on
validity in the federal court. The United States Court of Appeals reluctantly approved
the procedure. Adkins v. United States District Court, 431 F.2d 859 (9th Cir. 1970).
This procedure is to be commended since it afforded the defendant a federal forum
that he well deserved. The agreement of the state court should not be required however.
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manifest policy of providing a federal forum for the adjudication of
validity questions to defendants who desire such a forum. 44
Another possibility, one called for by judges and commentators
alike, is a more flexible approach to the question of when a given
action "arises under" the federal patent laws. No simple analytical
test, such as that of Justice Holmes, is sufficiently related to the
reasons for providing a federal forum in any given lawsuit.145 As one
commentator has noted. 46
What is surprising is the continuing belief that there is, or
should be, a single, all-purpose, neutral analytical concept which
marks out federal question jurisdiction. A frank recognition of
the pragmatic nature of the decision-making process would help
throw light on the factors which actually induce decision. It
would, moreover, reduce the danger that a judge would be be-
guiled by one of the numerous analytical tests into reaching an
indefensible result.
Some of the suggested pragmatic criteria are:147
1. the extent of the caseload increase for federal trial courts ifjurisdiction is recognized;
2. the extent to which cases of this class will, in practice, turn on
issues of state or federal law;
144. Professors Hart and Wechsler ask, "Would it be practicable to establish a
procedure for reference of patent questions by the state courts to a federal court? Wise?
Constitutional?" H. HART & H. WECHSLER, supra note 95, at 757. Such a procedure
for reference of state law questions by the federal courts to a state court presently exists
in a number of states. E.g., WASH. REV. CODE §§ 2.60.010-.900 (1967). Its constitution-
ality (under state law) seems established though its wisdom has been questioned. See
Comment, Inter-Jurisdictional Certification and Full Faith and Credit in Federal Courts,
45 WA H. L. REV. 167 (1970). Whether or not a federal court can constitutionally accept
a reference of a patent question from a state court (the main constitutional obstacle
being the "case or controversy" requirement of Article III), the procedure is unwise. In
a reference, the court finds the facts and then certifies the question of the law and its
application to the facts to the referee court. The expertise and policy sensitivity of a
federal court toward patent questions such as the validity of a patent is most needed in
the fact-finding process. The declaratory judgment procedure described in the text pre-
serves the role of the federal court as fact-finder.
145. See T.B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu, 339 F.2d 823, 827 (2d Cir. 1964), where Judge
Friendly comments:
It has come to be realized that Mr. justice Holmes' formula is more useful for
inclusion than for the exclusion for which it was intended. Even though the claim
is created by state law, a case may 'arise under' a law of the United States if the
complaint discloses a need for determining the meaning or application of such a law.
146. Cohen, The Broken Compass: The Requirement That a Case Arise "Directly"
Under Federal Law, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 890, 907 (1967).
147. Id. at 916.
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3. the extent of the necessity for an expert federal tribunal to
handle issues of federal law that do arise;
4. the extent of the necessity for a sympathetic federal tribunal
in cases of this class.
Decisions in the area of patent jurisdiction show a conspicuous
insensitivity to these kinds of pragmatic factors.148 In Koratron, for
example, a decision that the action did arise under federal law would
not significantly increase the caseload of the federal courts. That case,
and any other like it, clearly will turn on the federal law of patent
validity and infringement. Congress has long recognized the necessity
of an expert and sympathetic federal tribunal in cases raising validity
and infringement issues. Likewise, in many ostensibly contract actions
brought by a licensor or assignor, it will be clear from the face of the
pleadings that the real dispute between the parties is over the validity
or scope of the underlying patent.1"
148. See Professor Cohen's criticism on this ground of American Well Works v. Lane
& Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257 (1916). Cohen, supra note 146, at 907-08. I do not fully
agree with Professor Cohen's criticism, however. He assumes erroneously that in the
American Well Works-type tort action the validity and scope of the'patent are directly
in issue. That is not so. See notes 114-115 and accompanying text, supra.
149. A recent decision of interest is Imperial Appliance Corp. v. Hamilton Mfg. Co.,
430 F.2d 185 (7th Cir. 1970). A patent owner and an exclusive licensee agreed to sub-
license the patent. Included in the agreement was a "grant-back" clause, i.e., a covenant
by the sublicensee that all improvement patents developed upon the original patent should
be the property of the patent owner. Thereafter, a second patent was issued to the sub-
licensee. The sublicensee utilized the subsequent patent. The patent owner and the
exclusive licensee sued the sublicensee for infringement of the second patent (the first
patent having expired) in a federal district court. Diversity of citizenship was not
present. The Court upheld jurisdiction on the ground that the action was one arising
under the patent laws, over the defendant's contention that the action was merely one
of state contract law, i.e., whether the second patent was an "improvement" on the first
within the meaning of the agreement.
On the one hand, Imperial Appliance can be read as an enlightened decision applying
pragmatic criteria to determine the need for a federal forum. Thus the court reasons
that the "improvement" question is:
only nominally one of contract interpretation since the parties undoubtedly in-
cluded improvement as a term of art under the patent laws. Thus the determination
of whether a device is an improvement is a question of law resting upon matters
such as the validity of the patent on the alleged improvement and the extent of
its dependence upon existing patents. To require this question to be decided-lby
state courts when further questions of contract interpretation are not involved would
defeat the policies of uniformity and expertise which prompted Congress to grant
exclusive patent jurisdiction to the federal courts.
430 F.2d at 188 (citation omitted).
On the other hand, the decision does no more than recognize Pleader's Choice. The
plaintiff chose to plead his action as infringement; his title is challenged by the de-
fendant as a matter of defense. The more decisive problem would come if plaintiff had
pleaded his action as one for breach of contract and brought it in state court. Would
the policy considerations relied on by the federal court have convinced a state court that
it had no jurisdiction?
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Why have the federal courts been so reticent in this area? Why
have they adhered so consistently to a narrow and inflexible test for
"arising under" jurisdiction? In part, it may be a hesitancy to gain-
say the venerable Justice Holmes, who most forcefully articulated his
test for "arising under" jurisdiction in a patent case -American Well
Works Co. v. Lane & Bowler Co.150
More importantly, there may be a judicial aversion to the conse-
quences of deciding that a given case "arises under" the federal patent
laws. Since federal jurisdiction over cases arising under the patent
laws is exclusive, a decision that a given case so arises not only affirms
the availability of a federal forum but automatically eliminates state
court jurisdiction. This may be considered undesirable for two reasons.
First, while Congress has long provided for exclusive federal jurisdic-
tion in patent cases, the federal judiciary has viewed such exclusivity
with disfavor, principally because it forces a federal forum on parties
even if both are content to litigate in state court.151 Although federal
courts presumably possess a technical expertise and heightened policy
sensitivity in patent matters, state courts are generally considered
competent to adjudicate cases arising under federal law. Thus, while
a federal court might be disposed to provide a forum to one party in
a case who so desires it, it may hesitate to hold that the action is
within the federal court's jurisdiction if the consequence is to require
all future litigants in similar cases to sue exclusively in federal court.
Second, adoption of a flexible, pragmatic approach admittedly mul-
tiplies the chance of initial trial court error on the question of juris-
diction. If the case is brought in federal court and is determined on
appeal not to arise under the federal patent laws, there is a wasteful
dismissal. This risk is a common one in the field of federal jurisdiction
and perhaps can be tolerated. Where federal jurisdiction is exclusive,
however, the same risk is carried over to cases filed in state court.
Hence, there may be a greater hesitancy to apply a flexible approach
to the interpretation of an exclusive jurisdictional grant.
Furthermore, an action filed in state court cannot be removed to
150. 241 U.S. 257 (1916).
151. Cf. Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 507-08 (1962): "Concur-
rent jurisdiction has been a common phenomenon in our judicial history, and exclusive
federal court jurisdiction over cases arising under federal law has been the exception
rather than the rule."
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federal court by the defendant if it is determined to be one arising
under the federal patent laws.152 The only remedy is dismissal of the
action and commencement of a new one in federal court. Thus, flexi-
bility in deciding when an action arises under the patent laws leads
to undue rigidity in deciding permissible forums and the increased
risk of wasteful jurisdictional dismissals.
Judge Friendly in dictum in T.B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu52 makes a
very provocative suggestion as to how this reticence about exclusivity
could be avoided. The suggestion is that while some actions concern-
ing patents may arise under federal law and hence be within the
original and removal jurisdiction of the federal courts by virtue of
28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1441, they do not arise under the federal pat-
ent laws within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1338.' This suggestion
has the marvelous effect of putting certain traditional and well-estab-
lished forms of action within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal
courts. These include infringement actions, interferences and the like,
and actions for declaratory judgments of noninfringement or invalid-
ity. Other actions involving patents, where the need for a federal
forum is demonstrated on pragmatic grounds, would be left within the
original jurisdiction of both the state courts and the federal courts if
the amount in controversy requirement is met.'55 Such an action
commenced in state court could be removed to federal court by the
defendant.
The big problem is whether the suggestion can be squared with the
language of sections 1331 and 1338. If an action involving a patent
arises under federal law, what federal law can it be said to arise under
152. This rather bizarre result follows from the conception of removal jurisdiction as
derivative only. The federal court has jurisdiction of a removed action only if the state
court had jurisdiction. The ALI would change this indefensible rule by providing that
a dvil action within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts but erroneously filed
in state court may properly be removed to federal court. ALI STUDY, supra note 30, at
27, 206-07.
153. 339 F.2d 823, 828 (2d Cir. 1964). See 1965 Duxs L.J. 828. In T.B. Harms,
Judge Friendly considers the jurisdiction problem only in relation to copyright matters.
However, copyright jurisdiction is governed by the same statute as patent jurisdiction-
28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1964). See note 2, supra.
154. Thus, Judge Friendly suggests an affirmative answer to Professors Hart and
Wechsler's question: "Does the fact that the jurisdiction is exclusive under § 1338(a)
warrant any difference in the interpretation of the phrase 'arising under' in that section
as compared with § 1331?" H. HART & H. WECEsLER, supra-note 95, at 754 (1953).
155. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) has no amount in controversy requirement while 28 U.S.C.
1331 requires that there be $10,000 in controversy. See note 36, supra.
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other than the federal patent laws? The linguistic obstacle should not
be viewed as insurmountable, however. Section 1338 can be viewed
as a very narrow jurisdictional grant governed by the strict Holmes
test of "arising under" jurisdiction. Section 1331 can be viewed as
broader and more flexible. Such liberty with the language of jurisdic-
tional statutes is not unknown in other areas,"56 and the distinction
can be supported by the differing histories of the two statutes. Section
1338, granting federal jurisdiction in patent cases, long antedates the
general grant of federal question jurisdiction to the lower federal
courts and probably was intended to cover little other than infringe-
ment actions and bills in equity to settle patent interferences, which
were initially the only sorts of action in which the issue of a patent's
validity was thought to arise.1 57
CONCLUSION
The present division of jurisdiction between state and federal
courts over patent controversies is not based on rational factors. By
giving the plaintiff almost unfettered choice to plead his patent-re-
lated action as arising either under state contract or tort law or
under federal patent law, a long line of decisions allows law suits to be
litigated in state court though they involve such critical issues of
federal patent law as the validity of a patent and the scope of its
claims. This Pleader's Choice Rule has significantly undermined the
force of the Congressional declaration, dating back to at least 1836,
that patent litigation should be concentrated in the federal courts.
The recent decision in Koratron Company v. Deering Milliken, Inc.
exemplifies the dominance of Pleader's Choice by allowing a plaintiff
whose grievance was one of contributory infringement alternatively
to plead his case as a state law claim for interference with prospec-
tive advantage. Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, by potentially introducing the
defense of patent invalidity into every action for breach of a patent
156. E.g., Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerk's Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970)
(statute providing that "no court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue
any . . . injunction in any case involving . . . any labor dispute" does not mean what it
says); Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354 (1959) (statute
giving jurisdiction over cases arising under federal law does not include cases arising under
federal maritime law).
157. See section V, B, supra.
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license, multiplies the frequency with which such validity issues will
be litigated in state court.
There are good reasons for making a federal court at least an
available forum to either party, and not just to the plaintiff, in all
cases raising issues of federal patent law. Federal judges possess
greater expertise in handling patent matters. More importantly, with
their secure tenure and national perspective, they possess a higher
sensitivity to the delicate balance between the policies of encouraging
inventiveness on the one hand and of fostering free economic compe-
tition on the other.
Consequently, the courts should move away from a narrow and
analytic test of federal jurisdiction over patent cases that sanctions
pleader's choice and toward a more flexible and pragmatic test based
on the need for a federal forum in the particular case. This pragmatic
approach can best be achieved by an expanded reading of the general
statutory grant of federal question jurisdiction-28 U.S.C. § 1331-
rather than of the specific patent grant-28 U.S.C. § 1338(a). In turn,
Congress should by statute provide either for federal jurisdiction over
all contract or tort cases involving patents or for the removal of state
actions by either party whenever a substantial issue of federal patent
law is raised.
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